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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
JARED STARK, on behalf of himself and all 
others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GOOGLE LLC; GOOGLE IRELAND LTD.; 
GOOGLE COMMERCE LTD.; GOOGLE 




CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 
JURY TRIAL DEMAND 
Plaintiff Jared Stark (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, 
brings this Class Action Complaint for damages and injunctive relief against Defendants Google 
LLC; Google Ireland Ltd.; Google Commerce Ltd.; Google Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.; and Google 
Payment Corp. (collectively, “Google”) for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, for violations of California’s Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700, 
et. seq., and for violations of the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act, Kan. Stat. § 50-101, et seq. All 
allegations other than those concerning the Plaintiff are based on information and belief. 
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1. In the United States, nearly 90 percent of a user’s on-screen time on a mobile 
device is spent on a mobile application, or “app.” Mobile apps are most often downloaded from 
an app store, which centralizes and curates the distribution of mobile apps. 
2. Google owns and operates the largest app store, Google Play. The Google Play 
store comes pre-installed on almost all mobile devices running Google’s Android operating 
system (“OS”). The Google Play store offers users the choice of more than 2.96 million apps, 
and, in 2019, users worldwide downloaded those apps more than 84.3 billion times. 
3. To build this prodigious marketplace, Google represented that the Android OS 
would be maintained as “open” source software whereby anyone could create Android-
compatible products without undue restrictions. But, as the app store grew and as Google’s 
Android OS became the “must-have” operating software for mobile device original-equipment 
manufacturers (“OEMs”),1 Google began to close its ecosystem through a series of restrictive 
agreements that were designed to (and did in fact) deter and eliminate competition in the market 
for Android mobile apps and in-app products (“the Android Mobile App Distribution Market”). 
4. Google’s anticompetitive conduct, described below, allowed it to extract 
supracompetitive profits from consumers—like Plaintiff and Class Members—who paid Google 
directly for mobile apps and in-app content purchased through the Google Play store. Indeed, the 
Google Play store contains more than 90 percent of Android mobile app downloads worldwide. 
Google charges a 30 percent fee on every mobile app purchased through the Google Play store 
and on every in-app purchase made through an app downloaded from the Google Play store. 
These fees helped Google to generate more than $21.5 billion in ill-gotten revenue. 
5. Plaintiff and Class Members have also been harmed by Google’s anticompetitive 
scheme because: (1) developers set higher app prices due to the high costs imposed on 
developers by Google; and (2) app quality has been reduced as app developers generated lower 
1 European Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission fines Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices (July 
18, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4581.  
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6. Plaintiff seeks to recover the damages caused by Google’s unlawful 
anticompetitive conduct and to obtain an order enjoining Google from continuing to engage in 
these unlawful practices. 
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
7. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. Google LLC and 
Google Payment Corp. are headquartered in this District. All Defendants have engaged in 
sufficient minimum contacts with the United States and have purposefully availed themselves of 
the benefits and protections of United States and California law, such that the exercise of 
jurisdiction over them would comport with due process requirements. Further, the Defendants 
have consented to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by this Court. 
8. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal antitrust claims 
pursuant to the Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. The Court 
has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
9. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Google 
LLC and Google Payment Corp. maintain their principal places of business in the State of 
California and in this District, because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to 
Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this District, and because, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), any 
Defendants not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district and their joinder 
with others shall be disregarded in determining proper venue. In the alternative, personal 
jurisdiction and venue also may be deemed proper under Section 12 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 22, because Defendants may be found in or transact business in this District and a  
substantial portion of the affected interstate trade and commerce was carried out in this district.  
III. INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT  
10. Assignment of this case to the San Jose Division is proper pursuant to Civil Local 
Rule 3-2(c)(e) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s 
claims occurred in Santa Clara County, California.  
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11. Plaintiff Jared Stark is a natural person who resides in Leavenworth, Kansas.  
Plaintiff purchased and paid Google for one or more apps through the Google Play store and 
purchased and paid Google directly for in-app digital content through an app downloaded from 
the Google Play store within the last four years. 
12. Defendant Google LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal 
place of business at 1600 Amphitheatre Way, Mountain View, California. Google LLC is a 
technology company that provides internet-related services and products. Since 2005, Google 
has owned and developed the Android OS for use in Android licensed mobile devices. Google 
LLC is also the owner of the Google Play store through which developers of Android mobile 
apps sell their mobile app and in-app products to Android-operated mobile device users. Google 
LLC contracts with all app developers that distribute their apps through the Google Play store 
and is therefore a party to the anticompetitive contractual restrictions at issue in this suit. 
13. Defendant Google Ireland Limited (“Google Ireland”) is a limited company 
organized under the laws of Ireland with its principal place of business in Dublin, Ireland, and is 
a subsidiary of Google LLC. Google Ireland contracts with all app developers that distribute 
their apps through the Google Play store and is therefore a party to the anticompetitive 
contractual restrictions at issue in this suit. 
14. Defendant Google Commerce Limited (“Google Commerce”) is a limited 
company organized under the laws of Ireland with its principal place of business in Dublin, 
Ireland, and is a subsidiary of Google LLC. Google Commerce contracts with all app developers 
that distribute their apps through the Google Play store and is therefore a party to the 
anticompetitive contractual restrictions at issue in this suit.  
15. Defendant Google Asia Pacific Pte. Limited (“Google Asia Pacific”) is a private 
limited company organized under the laws of Singapore with its principal place of business in 
Mapletree Business City, Singapore, and is a subsidiary of Google LLC. Google Asia Pacific 
contracts with all app developers that distribute their apps through the Google Play store and is 
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therefore a party to the anticompetitive contractual restrictions at issue in this suit.  
16. Defendant Google Payment Corp. (“Google Payment”) is a Delaware corporation 
with its principal place of business in Mountain View, California, and is a subsidiary of Google 
LLC. Google Payment provides in-app payment processing services to Android app developers 
and Android users and collects a 30% commission on many types of processed payments, 
including payments for apps sold through the Google Play store and in-app purchases made 
within such apps.  
V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
GOOGLE MAINTAINS AN UNLAWFUL MONOPOLY IN THE ANDROID MOBILE 
APP DISTRIBUTION MARKET 
A. The Android Mobile App Distribution Market is a Relevant Product Market 
17. A mobile app is a standardized piece of software that is optimized for use on a 
mobile device. In some mobile apps, users are charged money for access to digital content or 
services, to share content, to play games, or to make transactions for physical or digital goods 
and services (an “in-app purchase”). 
18. Mobile apps may be pre-installed on a mobile device as a component of the OS 
by the OEM. Users can also transfer apps from another device through a process Google refers to 
as “sideloading.” But the predominant way—by far—that consumers access mobile apps is 
through an app store, which itself may be pre-installed on the mobile device. 
19. Through an app store, a user may search, browse, find, review, compare, buy, 
download, and remove a mobile app without having to use a separate device, making it critical to 
a mobile device user’s experience. The app store may also offer mobile app developers’ tools 
and services that support the building of mobile apps for that app store. 
20. The rules governing an app store are typically set forth by the app store 
proprietor—here, Google—and concern things like the types of mobile apps permitted in the app 
store; the absence of malware; how users pay for mobile apps; and how revenue is distributed 
between the mobile app developer and the app store. 
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21. Because mobile apps are built in a specific programming language and configured 
to run on a specific type of mobile device OS as “native apps,” distinct and separate product 
markets exist for mobile apps specific to the relevant OSs. For example, native apps developed 
for Apple iOS only work on Apple mobile devices and native apps developed for Android OS 
only work on Android mobile devices. Apple’s App Store and the Google Play store do not 
compete against one another because Android users cannot utilize iOS apps or the Apple App 
Store, and iOS users cannot utilize Android apps or the Google Play store. Consequently, 
Google’s dominance of the Android Mobile App Distribution Market is not constrained by 
Apple’s App Store and vice versa.2
22. Similarly, web sites and web apps are not competitively significant alternatives to 
the Android Mobile App Distribution Market. Mobile apps provide a deeper, richer user 
experience as compared to websites and web apps. For example, mobile apps can provide 
additional, unique functionalities by accessing specific features within the mobile device’s 
hardware and operating system, such as a camera or location services. Moreover, websites and 
web apps rely on an internet connection, whereas mobile apps may continue to function even 
when the mobile device loses internet access. Because of these intrinsic benefits, users 
overwhelmingly choose to access content and services on their mobile devices through mobile 
apps—including for basic communication, business transactions, entertainment, and news—even 
though mobile devices users could access that content on their mobile devices via the internet. In 
the United States, nearly 90 percent of user screen time on mobile devices is spent on mobile 
apps. 
23. The Android Mobile App Distribution Market is therefore a relevant market that 
is comprised of all the channels by which mobile apps are distributed to Android OS users. 
2 See, e.g., Google Android, No. AT.40099, European Commission Decision (July 18, 2018) 
(“EC Google Android Decision”) at ¶¶ 590673, 763, 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40099/40099_9993_3.pdf. 
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B. The United States is the Relevant Geographic Market 
24. The relevant geographic market for the Android Mobile App Distribution Market 
is the United States. App stores (and other app distribution channels) are broadly developed and 
distributed throughout the United States, as are the mobile apps contained within the app stores. 
Indeed, the Google Play store—and the apps downloaded through it—are available to Android 
users anywhere in the United States. 
C. Google has Monopoly Power in the Android Mobile App Distribution Market 
25. More than 90 percent of all app store downloads in the Android Mobile App 
Distribution Market are made through the Google Play store. 
26. Google has designed the Android ecosystem to discourage others from making 
available and users from downloading apps from sources other than Google Play. Google, as the 
proprietor of the Google Play store, has exercised its monopoly power by refusing to allow any 
rival app stores to be downloaded through the Google Play store. Accordingly, there are only two 
ways by which an Android phone user may access rival mobile app stores: an (1) app store may 
be pre-installed on the mobile device; or (2) a mobile app store may be sideloaded onto the 
mobile device.3 Google has thwarted meaningful user access for each. 
27. First, Google has successfully demanded and reached agreements with Android  
mobile device OEMs to require OEMs to pre-install and prominently display the Google Play 
store on the mobile devices they manufacture. Pre-installation is crucial because, as Google 
explains, “most users just use what comes on the device. People rarely change defaults.”4
28. Second, although users can theoretically sideload a third-party app store, Google 
has created guardrails designed to steer consumers away from sideloading. In order to sideload 
an app store, a user must go through a complicated multi-step process to download the app store 
to another device, load it onto the mobile device, and bypass multiple security and safety 
warnings set up by Google that suggest sideloading is unsafe. 
3 Theoretically, a user could use an app store like Google Play to download a rival app store. But Google has banned 
rival app stores from Google Play. 
4 EC Google Android Decision at ¶ 787(2).  
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29. The difficulty of sideloading any app or app store was described by Epic, the 
maker of the popular mobile game Fortnight, in a recent lawsuit it filed against Google: 
Google ensures that the Android process is technically complex, confusing and 
threatening, filled with dire warnings that scare most consumers into abandoning 
the lengthy process. For example, depending on the version of Android running 
on a mobile device, downloading and installing Fortnite on an Android device 
could take as many as 16 steps or more, including requiring the user to make 
changes to the device’s default settings and manually granting various 
permissions while being warned that doing so is dangerous. 
30. Even where a user persists and successfully loads a rival app store, Google 
discourages continued use of that app store by limiting some basic app functions that are 
available to apps downloaded through Google Play. For instance, apps downloaded through 
Google Play will automatically update in the mobile device’s background. In contrast, updating 
an app through, for example, Amazon’s Android app store requires a user to manually update 
each app through a multi-step process. By making the app update process difficult, Google 
further discourages users from seeking out rival app stores and the apps offered therein. 
31. By impeding (or interfering with) user access to third-party app stores, Google 
was able to extract supracompetitive prices for its Android app distribution services and for 
processing in-app purchases on apps downloaded through the Google Play store. Google has 
charged a 30 percent fee on sales of paid apps and a 30 percent fee for in-app purchases. Google 
collects and processes these fees directly from Plaintiff and Class Members, remitting the 
remainder of their payments to the mobile app developer. These fees generated more than $21.5 
billion in global revenue for Google in 2018. If Google had operated the Google Play store in a 
competitive market, free of Google’s anticompetitive restraints, then the fees that Google could 
have collected from Plaintiff and Class Members would be significantly lower. Indeed, the fees 
charged by alternative electronic payment processing tools—like PayPal and Square—are 2.9 
percent and between 2.6 and 3.5 percent, respectively. 
32. Google has abused and maintained its monopoly power in the Android Mobile 
App Distribution Market through restrictive, non-negotiable agreements with mobile app 
developers, who must choose between complying with Google’s draconian terms of use or 
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exiting Google’s ecosystem. To have a mobile app listed on the Google Play store, mobile app 
developers must agree and have agreed with Google to not license their mobile app to any rival 
app stores. Indeed, Google’s developer agreements mandate that developers may not “make 
available any product that has a purpose that facilitates the distribution of software applications 
and games for use on Android devices outside of Google Play.” This has enabled Google to 
secure the most desired and highest quality mobile apps while simultaneously foreclosing access 
to mobile apps by rival app stores. Mobile app developers must acquiesce to Google’s demand 
because more than 90 percent of all Android mobile app downloads occur through Google Play. 
33. There are significant barriers to users switching mobile OSs.5 In 2018, Consumer 
Intelligence Research Partners reported that more than 90 percent of Android users who bought a 
new mobile device purchased a new Android mobile device. 
34. Part of a user’s lack of interest in switching is due to network effects. Google 
Android and Apple iOS have different operating concepts, user interface designs, and setting and 
configuration options. Users tend to pick one, learn it, invest in mobile apps and storage, and 
stick with it. Switching operating systems may entail the loss of compatibility with other smart 
devices designed to work in conjunction with the mobile device and its OS and the hassle of 
porting data from one OS to another. While mobile devices have a limited lifespan, and users 
might be expected to “break the lock-in cycle” when it is time to upgrade to a new device, users’ 
reliance on software, data, and files, and other hardware and accessories that are only compatible 
with one product ecosystem, make it unlikely that they would switch to a non-compatible mobile 
device. 
35. Based on the foregoing, there is abundant evidence that Google has monopoly 
power in the Android Mobile App Distribution Market. 
D. Google has Engaged in Anticompetitive Conduct in the Android Mobile App 
Distribution Market Resulting in Anticompetitive Effects 
36. Google has implemented a multi-prong anticompetitive scheme to establish and 
5 EC Google Android Decision at ¶¶ 590673, 763. 
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maintain its monopoly in the Android Mobile App Distribution Market and foreclose rival app 
store distribution channels. As a direct result of Google’s anticompetitive scheme, it has charged 
supracompetitive prices for mobile app and in-app purchases. 
E. Google’s Anticompetitive Restraints on OEMs 
37. Google has imposed and OEMs have agreed to anticompetitive covenants in 
Google’s Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (“MADA”). This agreement, among other 
things, has required OEMs to: 
 License the entire suite of Google applications and services (such as Google Play 
Services, Google Chrome, Gmail, Google Search, Google Maps, and YouTube) as a 
condition for licensing the Android OS; 
 Pre-install the Google Play store, as well as up to 30 other proprietary Google apps; 
and 
 Place the Google Play store on or near the main “home screen page” in its default 
configuration. 
38. OEMs must agree and have agreed to Google’s anticompetitive, restrictive terms 
and conditions; if they do not agree, they risk losing access to the Android OS. For example, in 
2012 Acer partnered with Alibaba to release products on Alibaba’s OS, Aliyun. When Google 
learned of this, it threatened to terminate its partnership with Acer. Acer subsequently abandoned 
its deal with Alibaba. 
39. The restrictive MADA terms and conditions substantially limit the ability of rival 
app stores to meaningfully compete against Google in the Android Mobile App Distribution 
Market. By requiring pre-installation and prominent display of the Google Play store, Google 
ensures that competing app stores are at a significant disadvantage the moment the user takes a 
mobile device out of the box. Google has acknowledged the competitive significance of pre-
installation, noting that “[p]reloading remains valuable to users, and hence device manufacturers, 
despite full unbundling because most users just use what comes on the device. People rarely 
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40. For example, Epic, which makes the popular game Fortnight, tried to partner with 
LG, an Android-licensed OEM, to ease the restrictions by which users could download and play 
its game. But LG ultimately refused, informing Epic that its contract with Google required LG 
“to block side downloading off Google Play Store this year.” (emphasis added). 
41. Google’s restrictive MADA agreements have therefore foreclosed meaningful 
competition in the Android Mobile App Distribution Market, allowing Google to charge 
supracompetitive prices for mobile app and in-app purchases. The anticompetitive MADA 
agreements have also harmed Plaintiff and Class Members by limiting consumer choice. Absent 
Google’s unlawful restraints of trade, OEMs would be free to negotiate with third-party app 
stores for prominent placement on the OEMs’ mobile device home screens. Third-party app 
stores could then attract prominent app developers to their store. Plaintiff and Class Members 
would benefit from such competition through added choices and lowered costs for mobile apps 
and in-app purchases. 
F. Google has Imposed Anticompetitive Restraints on Mobile-App Developers 
42. Google has imposed anticompetitive contractual restrictions on app developers 
through its Google Play Developer Distribution Agreement (“DDA”). Each of the Defendants, 
except Google Payment, is a party to the DDA. Google imposes the anticompetitive contractual 
restrictions in the DDA to foreclose meaningful competition in the Android Mobile App 
Distribution Market, thereby ensuring rival app stores lack access to high-quality, in-demand 
mobile apps. Indeed, Google has refused to negotiate any provision of the DDA and has required 
all mobile-app developers to sign the DDA before Google will list their mobile app on the 
Google Play store. 
43. The restrictive provisions in the DDA include: 
 Section 3.2 requires that mobile device app developers enter into a separate 
agreement with Google’s payment processor, Google Payment, to receive payment 
6 EC Google Android Decision at ¶ 787(2). 
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for and from apps and in-app digital content; 
 Section 4.1 mandates compliance with Google’s Developer Program Policies. These 
Policies require, among other things, that mobile device app developers use Google’s 
proprietary in-app billing for in-app game payments, as well as certain other digital 
in-app purchases; 
 Section 4.5 mandates that developers “may not use Google Play to distribute or make 
available any Product that has a purpose that facilitates the distribution of software 
applications and games for use on Android devices outside of Google Play”; and 
 Section 8.3 broadly grants Google the right to remove any Android app it believes has 
violated any portion of the DDA. 
44. Mobile-app developers seeking access to Android users through the Google Play 
store have had no choice but to accept Google’s demands or suffer precipitous declines in 
downloads and revenue due to a lack of access to users. Indeed, removal from Google Play could 
mean that basic functions, such as automatic updating of apps in the background, which is 
available for apps downloaded from the Google Play store, may be disrupted. Meanwhile, 
updating an app downloaded through a rival app store requires users to follow a multi-step, 
manual process each time an update is made available. The DDA thus enables Google to secure 
the most desired and highest quality mobile apps for itself while simultaneously foreclosing 
access to rival app stores. 
45. As the sole proprietor of the Google Play store, Google has exercised its 
gatekeeping power to constrain competition and foreclose rival access. Numerous market 
participants have complained to congressional staffers that Google uses arbitrary rule violations 
of various Google Play policies as a pretext for retaliatory conduct and to foreclose competition. 
46. In the absence of these unlawful restraints, Google would not be able to impose 
supracompetitive fees that drive developers to charge and users to pay higher prices for mobile 
apps and in-app purchases. 
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VI. ANTITRUST INJURY 
47. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered antitrust injury as a direct result of 
Google’s unlawful conduct. 
48. Plaintiff and Class Members have purchased Android mobile apps and in-app 
digital content directly from Google through the Google Play store. 
49. As described above, Google’s restrictive contracts and anticompetitive practices 
have foreclosed competition in the Android Mobile App Distribution Market and enabled Google 
to charge Plaintiff and Class Members supracompetitive fees for mobile app and in-app 
purchases. 
VII. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 
50. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this 
action on behalf of himself and on behalf of the following class (the “Class”): 
All persons in the United States who, within the relevant statute of limitations (the 
“Class Period”): (1) paid for a mobile app on the Google Play store; (2) paid 
subscription fees for a mobile app obtained on the Google Play store; or (3) 
purchased in-app digital content from a mobile app that was downloaded through 
the Google Play store. 
51. Excluded from the Class are the Court, Defendants and their parent, subsidiary, 
and affiliated entities, and their officers, directors, employees, affiliates, legal representatives, 
predecessors, successors, and assigns. 
52. Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Due 
to the nature of the trade and commerce involved, there are, perhaps, tens of millions of 
geographically dispersed Class Members, the exact number and identities of whom are known 
exclusively to Defendants. 
53. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class Members and predominate 
over any questions affecting solely individual members of the Class. The questions of law and 
fact common to the Class include: 
A. Whether Google has monopoly power in the Android Mobile App Distribution 
Market; 
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B. Whether Google’s contractual restrictions with OEMs furthered Google’s 
monopolization of the Android Mobile App Distribution Market; 
C. Whether Google’s contractual restrictions with mobile app developers furthered 
Google’s monopolization of the Android Mobile App Distribution Market; 
D. Whether Google’s conduct resulted in supracompetitive prices for Android mobile 
apps; 
E. Whether Google’s conduct resulted in supracompetitive prices for in-app digital 
content purchases; 
F. Whether Google’s conduct has been detrimental to Plaintiff and Class Members; and 
G. The appropriate Class-wide measure of damages. 
54. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class, as all Class Members were 
similarly affected by Google’s common course of wrongful conduct in violation of federal and 
state law, as complained of herein. Moreover, the damages and injuries of Plaintiff and Class 
Members were directly caused by Google’s wrongful conduct. 
55. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has 
retained counsel that is competent and experienced in class-action litigation. Plaintiff has no 
interests that conflict with (or is otherwise antagonistic to) the interests of other Class Members. 
56. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Further, as the 
damages suffered by individual Class Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden 
of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the 
wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in management of this action as a class action. 
VIII. CLAIMS 
UNLAWFUL MONOPOLY OF THE ANDROID MOBILE APP 
DISTRIBUTION MARKET IN VIOLATION OF SHERMAN ACT § 2 
57. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs as if fully stated here. 
58. Google’s conduct has violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits the 
“monopoliz[ation of] any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
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nations.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
59. The Android Mobile App Distribution Market in the United States is a valid 
antitrust market. 
60. Google has and continues to hold monopoly power in the Android Mobile App 
Distribution Market. 
61. Google has unlawfully acquired and maintained monopoly power in the Android 
Mobile App Distribution Market through the anticompetitive acts described in this Complaint, 
including, but not limited to: (1) leveraging its Android OS and Google suite of products to 
impose anticompetitive contractual restrictions in its agreements with OEMs; (2) requiring 
OEMs to pre-install and prominently display the Google Play store on the “home screen” of each 
mobile device; (3) requiring app developers to sign the Google Play DDA before any app is 
made available for download on the Google Play store, which DDA has mandated that app 
developers (a) “may not use Google Play to distribute or make available any Product that has a 
purpose that facilitates the distribution of software applications and games for use on Android 
devices outside of Google Play” and (b) must use Google’s proprietary in-app billing for certain 
in-app purchases; and (4) blocking mobile apps offered outside the Google Play store from 
providing important functions, including automatic updating while an app is in the background, 
which is available for apps downloaded through Google Play.
62. Google’s conduct has had no legitimate pro-competitive justification considering 
its anticompetitive effects, and therefore it has unreasonably restrained competition in the 
Android Mobile App Distribution Market. 
63. Google’s conduct has affected a substantial volume of interstate commerce. 
64. Google’s conduct has had substantial anticompetitive effects, including increased 
prices and costs for mobile apps and in-app products charged to Plaintiff and Class Members. 
65. Plaintiff and Class Members have been injured and damaged by Google’s 
anticompetitive conduct as Plaintiff and Class Members have been forced to pay 
supracompetitive prices for mobile app and in-app purchases. 
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66. Plaintiff and Class Members have been further deprived of the ability to choose 
between mobile apps and in-app products on the Google Play store or lower-cost, third-party app 
stores that would have been available had Google not engaged in the misconduct alleged here. 
67. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered and continue to suffer damages and 
irreparable injury. Such damages and irreparable injury will not cease until and unless this Court 
issues an injunction terminating Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
UNLAWFUL RESTRAINTS OF TRADE CONCERNING THE 
ANDROID MOBILE APP DISTRIBUTION MARKET IN VIOLATION OF SHERMAN 
ACT § 1 
68. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs as if fully stated here. 
69. Google’s conduct has violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits 
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
70. The Android Mobile App Distribution Market in the United States is a valid 
antitrust market. 
71. As alleged herein, Google entered into anticompetitive agreements with third 
parties that have unreasonably restricted competition in the Android Mobile App Distribution 
Market. 
72. These agreements include the MADA agreements Google entered into with 
OEMs that condition access to Android OS on: (1) licensing the entire suite of Google 
applications and services (such as Google Play Services, Google Chrome, Gmail, Google Search, 
Google Maps, and YouTube); (2) pre-installing the Google Play store, as well as up to 30 other 
proprietary Google apps; and (3) prominently displaying the Google Play store on or near the 
main “home screen page” as the default configuration. 
73. These agreements also include the DDA agreements Google entered with mobile-
app developers that, as a condition of having their app listed on the Google Play store, required 
mobile-app developers to: (1) “not use Google Play to distribute or make available any Product 
that has a purpose that facilitates the distribution of software applications and games for use on 
Case 5:20-cv-08309   Document 1   Filed 11/24/20   Page 16 of 21






























Android devices outside of Google Play”; and (2) use Google’s proprietary in-app billing for 
certain in-app purchases. 
74. These agreements have had no legitimate pro-competitive justification 
considering their anticompetitive effects and have therefore unreasonably restrained competition 
in the Android Mobile App Distribution Market. 
75. Google’s conduct has affected a substantial volume of interstate commerce. 
76. Google’s conduct has had substantial anticompetitive effects, including increased 
prices and costs for mobile apps and in-app products charged to Plaintiff and Class Members. 
77. Plaintiff and Class Members have been injured and damaged by Google’s 
anticompetitive conduct as Plaintiff and Class Members have been forced to pay 
supracompetitive prices for mobile app and in-app purchases. 
78. Plaintiff and Class Members have been further deprived of the ability to choose 
between mobile apps and in-app products on the Google Play store or lower-cost, third-party app 
stores that would have been available had Google not engaged in the misconduct alleged here. 
79. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered and continue to suffer damages and 
irreparable injury. Such damages and irreparable injury will not cease until and unless this Court 
issues an injunction terminating Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT OF TRADE IN THE ANDROID 
MOBILE APP DISTRIBUTION MARKET IN VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA 
CARTWRIGHT ACT  
80. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs as if fully stated here.  
81. Google’s acts and practices detailed above have violated the Cartwright Act, Cal. 
Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700 et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, the combination of resources by 
two or more persons to restrain trade or commerce or to prevent market competition. See §§ 
16720, 16726.  
82. Under the Cartwright Act, a “combination” is formed when the anticompetitive 
conduct of a single firm coerces other market participants to involuntarily adhere to the 
anticompetitive scheme.  
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83. The Android Mobile App Distribution Market is a valid antitrust market.  
84. As alleged herein, Google has entered into agreements with third parties that have 
unreasonably restricted competition in the Android Mobile App Distribution Market.  
85. These agreements include the MADA agreements Google entered into with 
OEMs that condition access to Android OS on: (1) licensing the entire suite of Google 
applications and services (such as Google Play Services, Google Chrome, Gmail, Google Search, 
Google Maps, and YouTube); (2) pre-installing the Google Play Store, as well as up to 30 other 
proprietary Google apps; and (3) prominently displaying the Google Play Store on or near the 
main “home screen page” as the default configuration. 
86. These agreements also include the DDA agreements Google entered with mobile 
app developers that, as a condition of having their app listed on the Google Play store, required 
mobile app developers to: (1) “not use Google Play to distribute or make available any Product 
that has a purpose that facilitates the distribution of software applications and games for use on 
Android devices outside of Google Play”; and (2) use Google’s proprietary in-app billing for 
certain in-app purchases. 
87.  Google’s conduct has had substantial anticompetitive effects, including increased 
prices and costs for mobile apps and in-app products charged to Plaintiff and Class Members. 
88. Plaintiff and Class Members have been injured and damaged by Google’s 
anticompetitive conduct as Plaintiff and Class Members have been forced to pay 
supracompetitive prices for mobile app and in-app purchases. 
89. Plaintiff and Class Members have been further deprived of the ability to choose 
between mobile apps and in-app products on the Google Play Store or lower-cost, third-party app 
stores that would have been available had Google not engaged in the misconduct alleged here. 
90. It is appropriate to bring this action under the Cartwright Act because many of the 
illegal agreements were made in California and purport to be governed by California law, many 
affected consumers reside in California, Google has its principal place of business in California, 
and overt acts in furtherance of Google’s anticompetitive scheme took place in California. 
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91. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered and continue to suffer damages and 
irreparable injury. Such damages and irreparable injury will not cease until and unless this Court 
issues an injunction terminating Google’s anticompetitive conduct. 
KANSAS RESTRAINT OF TRADE ACT  
92. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all other paragraphs as if fully stated here. 
93. Google’s acts and practices detailed above violate the Kansas Restraint of Trade 
Act, Kan. Stat. § 50-101, et seq., which prohibits, inter alia, combinations to create or carry out 
restrictions in trade or commerce, increase the price of merchandise, or prevent competition in 
the sale of merchandise, id. 
94. Google’s conduct and practices have substantial anticompetitive effects in 
Kansas, including increased prices and costs, reduced innovation, poorer customer service, and 
lowered output.  
95. Plaintiff and Class Members have been harmed by Defendants’ anticompetitive 
conduct in a manner that the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act was intended to prevent. For 
example, Plaintiff and Class Members paid more for Android apps and/or in-app purchases than 
they would have paid in a competitive market. Plaintiff and Class Members have also been 
injured because Google’s unlawful monopolization of the Android Mobile App Distribution 
Market has extinguished their freedom to choose between the Google Play store and lower cost 
market alternatives that would have been available had Google not monopolized the market. 
Plaintiff and Class Members have also been injured because Google’s establishment and 
maintenance of monopoly pricing has caused a reduction in the output and supply of Android 
apps and in-app purchases, which would have been more abundantly available in a competitive 
market. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered and continue to suffer damages and 
irreparable injury, and such damages and injury will not abate until an injunction ending 
Google’s anticompetitive conduct issues. 
IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court: 
Case 5:20-cv-08309   Document 1   Filed 11/24/20   Page 19 of 21






























A. Permanently enjoin Defendants from monopolizing the Android Mobile App 
Distribution Market; 
B. Permanently enjoin Defendants from engaging in anticompetitive conduct in 
connection with its agreements with OEMs and app developers; 
C. Award Plaintiff and Class Members treble damages for injuries caused by 
Defendants’ unlawful conduct in violation of federal and state antitrust laws; 
D. Award Plaintiff and the Class their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and 
E. Grant Plaintiff such further relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
X. JURY TRIAL DEMAND 
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury of all issues so triable. 
DATED this 24th day of November, 2020. 
StandardSig KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P. 
By /s/ Alison Chase
Alison Chase (SBN 226976) 
801 Garden Street, Suite 301 
Santa Barbara, CA 93101 
Telephone: (805) 456-1496 
Fax: (805) 456-1497 
Achase@kellerrohrback.com 
Laura R. Gerber Pro Hac Vice forthcoming
Matthew M. Gerend Pro Hac Vice 
forthcoming
Karin B. Swope Pro Hac Vice forthcoming
Garrett Heilman Pro Hac Vice forthcoming
1201 Third, Suite 3200 
Seattle, WA 98101 
Telephone: (206) 623-1900 





Attorneys for Plaintiff Jared Stark  
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